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Switzerland’s Arms-Export Referendum: Jobs, Security and the Limits of Neutrality

Oct 12
6 min read

Swiss voters will decide on November 29 whether to approve a revision of the War Material Act that would loosen export and re-export controls. The Federal Council says the change is needed to preserve the country’s defence industry, its skilled jobs and its ability to supply its own armed forces. Opponents warn that wider exceptions could weaken safeguards designed to keep Swiss-made weapons away from wars and human-rights abusers. 1 2


Switzerland’s Arms-Export Referendum: Jobs, Security and the Limits of Neutrality

The dispute tests how far a neutral country can adjust its arms policy to meet security and industrial concerns without diluting the controls that give its neutrality credibility. Parliament passed the amendment in December 2025. A cross-party committee then collected enough signatures to force a national referendum, leaving the final decision to voters. 1 2

 

Photo: State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO). 1
Photo: State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO). 1

 

What the law would change

Under the rules currently in force, Switzerland generally cannot export war materiel to a country involved in an armed conflict or committing serious and systematic human-rights violations. Buyers must also sign a non-re-export declaration: they need Swiss permission before transferring the equipment to another state. The tighter regime took effect in 2022, after Parliament removed the government’s previous authority to grant exceptions. 2

 

The amendment would give special treatment to 25 partner states identified in the relevant ordinance. The group includes 19 European countries, as well as Argentina, Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand and the United States. Exports to those partners could be authorised even when a recipient is involved in an armed conflict, provided the decision remains compatible with Swiss neutrality and the country’s foreign- and security-policy interests. 1 2

 

Parliament also approved a mechanism allowing the Federal Council to depart from normal authorisation criteria in exceptional circumstances when necessary to protect Switzerland’s interests. The government could still require a non-re-export declaration when foreign-policy, neutrality or security concerns justify one. Existing commitments for weapons already delivered would remain in force. The government stresses that export licences must continue to comply with neutrality law, human rights and Switzerland’s international obligations. 1

 

This is a significant change in discretion and default rules, but it is not a blanket removal of export controls. The question before voters is whether the new exceptions and case-by-case safeguards strike the right balance.

 

Why the government links exports to jobs and security

The Swiss defence sector is small by national economic standards but strategically important, according to an industry-focused report by Bloomberg carried by SWI swissinfo.ch. It estimated that the sector accounts for just over 0.2% of Swiss economic output and around 14,000 jobs. The same report described companies shifting production or assembly abroad because foreign customers feared that Swiss export restrictions could prevent future transfers of equipment. At one firm, Systems Assembling, the relocation of much of its contracting activity to Portugal came alongside the loss of half of the 120 jobs at its Swiss headquarters. 4

 

For companies making components or complete systems, export permissions shape more than the final sale. They affect whether overseas buyers will include Swiss suppliers in a tender, whether production can be organised across borders, and whether a firm can offer predictable terms to customers. Swiss manufacturers have said that some foreign buyers have avoided Swiss-made products because of the legal uncertainty around re-export. 3 4

 

That is the economic case behind the government’s jobs argument. If orders fall or production migrates, Switzerland may lose specialist workers, industrial know-how and suppliers that would be difficult to rebuild quickly. The Federal Council also argues that a viable domestic sector helps the country obtain equipment and remain part of international supply chains. Because Switzerland belongs to no defence alliance, the government says it needs a stronger negotiating position to secure supplies during a crisis. 1

 

The industry’s employment case should not be confused with proof that the bill will preserve a specific number of jobs. The law changes access to export markets; it does not guarantee new orders, prevent firms from relocating for other reasons, or create a direct employment programme. The likely effect will depend on how governments and buyers respond, how often Switzerland uses its new discretion, and whether firms keep production at home.

 

Neutrality, Ukraine and the opposition’s concerns

The debate grew sharper after Germany and other European governments asked Switzerland to permit the re-export of Swiss-made ammunition and equipment to Ukraine. Bern refused under the existing rules. Switzerland’s neutrality does not, by itself, prohibit arms exports, but the current domestic law is more restrictive than the minimum requirements of international neutrality law. 2 4

 

Ukraine is not among the 25 partner states named for the special procedure. A “yes” vote would therefore not, on its own, open a direct Swiss export route to Kyiv. The reform instead focuses on the listed partners and on the rules governing onward transfers. That distinction is central to both sides of the campaign: supporters see it as a way to avoid excluding Swiss suppliers from partner-country markets, while critics argue that weakened controls could make the destination and later use of Swiss weapons harder to monitor. 2 5

 

Opponents, including left-wing parties, peace groups and civil-society organisations, say the government would gain too much discretion to waive safeguards using broad tests such as “exceptional circumstances” and the protection of Swiss interests. They warn that arms could reach states involved in conflict or systematic rights abuses, and argue that a neutral state risks undermining its diplomatic credibility if it supplies weapons that may be used in conflicts where it seeks to mediate. 1 5

 

The opposing coalition also questions whether an emergency industrial rationale is supported by the latest sales picture. It points to reported export growth in 2025 and argues that the industry is not in immediate need of looser rules. Supporters answer that one year of strong exports does not resolve the longer-term risk of losing access to partner-country supply chains. The disagreement is therefore partly about which indicator matters most: current export totals, future orders, or the survival of production capacity inside Switzerland. 5

 

Closing Thoughts

The referendum is about more than whether Swiss companies can sell more weapons. It asks what kind of industrial base a neutral state needs, and how much control it should retain over equipment once it has crossed the border. The government’s security argument is strongest where it shows concrete links between exports, domestic production and reliable access to supplies. The opponents’ case is strongest where it asks whether broad exceptions can be overseen consistently and whether end-use safeguards will remain meaningful.

 

What does this look like in practice?

If voters approve the amendment, the Federal Council would apply the new provisions through export-licensing decisions. A listed partner could receive Swiss war materiel despite being involved in a conflict, subject to neutrality and Swiss foreign- and security-policy tests. The government could still require prior approval for onward transfers where it considers that necessary. Firms might find it easier to bid for contracts with eligible partners, but each licence and the government’s use of its veto powers would determine how the policy works in real cases. 1 2

 

If voters reject the amendment, the stricter statutory limits would remain. Switzerland would keep requiring consent for re-exports under the current framework, and its authorities would continue to refuse exports barred by the law. The unresolved trade-off would remain: stronger end-use control at home, but greater risk that foreign buyers choose suppliers whose governments allow more predictable onward transfers. 2 3

 

What is the relevance of this?

The vote could shape Switzerland’s standing with European defence partners, the future location of specialist manufacturing, and the public’s confidence in the country’s claims to neutrality and human-rights responsibility. It also illustrates a policy choice facing other states: whether industrial resilience requires more flexible arms exports, or whether safeguards lose their value when exceptions become easier to use. The Swiss electorate will decide where to draw that line on November 29, 2026.

 

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